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THE  CORE  ISSUE:  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION
Whatever the current array of alternatives,  each one seeks to affect
the  core issue-the relative  distribution  of income.  The  1969 poverty
threshold  for  a  four-person  family  was  $3,720,  and  24  million  per-
sons lived on incomes below their  poverty threshold.
What  pattern of income  distribution  should exist  is,  of  course,  as
subjective  a matter  as  determining  the  poverty  threshold.  But  as  we
come  to  understand  that  poverty  is  normally  imposed  upon  people
by  forces  beyond their control,  we seek  ways  to  provide  a  minimum
income.  Consequently,  current  welfare  alternatives  focus  on  income
maintenance  as we  seek  to mold an  acceptable  policy  to serve  as  suc-
cessor to existing  welfare policy-a term  that  refers  especially  to  Old
Age Assistance,  Aid to the Blind, Aid to  the Totally and  Permanently
Disabled,  and Aid  to Families  with  Dependent  Children.
VALUES  CONFLICT
An  income  maintenance  proposal  must  be  compatible  with  the
values  we  hold  concerning  work,  equality  of  access  to  opportunity,
and social responsibility.  These values  serve a critical role in examina-
tion of income maintenance  alternatives.
The  most  widely  known  dictum  concerning  our  values  toward
work  is:  "He  who  does  not  work  should  not  eat."  The  earning  of
money  is an obligation that the  individual is  supposed to  feel.
A  basic  assumption  undergirds  these  statements,  namely,  that
people  have  access  to  the  opportunity  to  work.  The  Commission  on
Income  Maintenance  Programs  has  concluded  that  this  assumption
no longer holds. Few who observe  the need for jobs and lack  of access
to jobs in rural  or urban  America  would  dispute this  conclusion.
The concept  of equality  of  access  to  opportunity extends  beyond
that expressed  as  the right  to equal  opportunity.  In  essence,  equality
of  access  to  opportunity  recognizes  that  individuals  born  with  equal
ability  do not  have equal  access to  means for  developing  that  ability
or marketing their ability  after  it is  developed.
Any  consideration  of  equality  of  access  to  opportunity  results  in
many questions.  Did  the  access  to opportunity  obtained by  that per-
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generation  ago?  Did  access  to an  opportunity  to  work  terminate  for
that person  as  a  result of  an  activity  conducted  by  some  mechanical
or chemical  engineer  ten years  ago?  Was  access  to proper  nutrition,
education,  or health  denied  for that person  by  accident  of  place  of
birth?  Was equality of  access to opportunity  denied because  he or she
was a member of a large family or a poor family or both?
Social  responsibility  extends  beyond  income  redistribution  and
job provision and beyond the concept that we  are our brother's  keeper
to  the  concept  of man's  humanity  to  man.  This becomes  quite  clear
if we consider  the  argument  that the poor  want  (1)  personal respect
as people,  (2)  social justice,  (3)  a political voice,  and  (4)  economic
opportunity.
Though  brief,  this sketch  illustrates  the  values  that mold income
maintenance  alternatives.  The  value  we  hold  about  work  dominates
the molding  process.  But  the  process  itself  is  bound  together  by  the
ethic  of  self-integrity.  It  has  been  said  that this  ethic  relates  to  the
status deserts  of dissenters.  Its central  judgment is that in case  of con-
flict,  both  the individual  and  his  group  (or  groups)  are  responsible
for  seeking  a  new mode  of  thought  and  practice  that will  unify  the
hitherto conflicting  views  of each.  Surely this  is  a necessary  viewpoint
in the task at hand.
INCOME  MAINTENANCE
All income  maintenance programs  seek to  achieve  income averag-
ing,  and  they  divide  into  two  major  classes.  Programs  designed  to
average one family's income  for  a number  of years  over the life-span
of  that  family  are  assigned  to  the  individual  equity  class.  Programs
averaging  one year's income  of a society  among families  by  means  of
cash  or in-kind  transfers,  which provide  income supplements  to  some
families  by  taxing  others,  are  placed  in  the  social  equity  class.  This
paper  considers  only  social  equity  or  income  supplement  programs.
The  basic  policy  questions  surrounding  income  supplements  are:  To
whom?  From whom?  In what  form?  At what  cost?
Cash  Transfers
Cash  transfer programs  consist  of money  transfers  not subject  to
use  restraints.  Transfers  in  this  form  enable  rational,  informed  in-
dividuals  seeking  to  maximize  satisfaction  per  dollar  of  income  to
reach the highest level of individual satisfaction.  Despite this economic
argument,  relatively  few  programs  designed  to  assist  the  poor  or
eliminate poverty provide  for  cash transfers;  they  provide  for service
or in-kind transfers.
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gorical  basis.  Universal  programs  apply  to  all  persons  meeting  a
single  criterion such  as being  over  age  65  or being  among  that set of
persons  defined  as  poor.  A  program  becomes  categorical  when  more
than  one  criterion  delimits  the  set  of  persons  eligible  to  receive
benefits.  For  example,  some poor  people  may  be denied  benefits  be-
cause they are not members  of a family with at least  one  child.
Proposals  are  being made to reform  an existing cash transfer  pro-
gram,  AFDC  (the  Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children
Program),  by using  relatively  few  criteria  to  delimit  who  is  eligible
for benefits.  Normally an AFDC  applicant  is  a female  head  of house-
hold.  To prove  eligibility:
1. She  must demonstrate  that  the  child  is  deprived  of  the  care
and  support  of one  parent by  death,  desertion,  incapacity,  or
(in  21  states)  unemployment.
2.  If the  cause  is  desertion,  she  must agree  to  report  the  child's
father to  the district attorney,  and usually, swear out a warrant
for nonsupport.
3.  In most  states  she must prove  that she  has been a  resident for
one year.
4.  She  must  show  that  she  has  no  real  property,  or  that  it  is
valued within  the prescribed  limits.
5.  She must show that her income is insufficient for self-support-
that there is  a budget  deficiency.
6.  She  must  meet  whatever  special  requirements  the  state  may
impose.
7.  She must  give  a "social  study"  describing  her  background  and
history  and  make  a  plan  for  herself  and  her  child  to  lead
toward self-support.
8.  She must submit to house visits  by social  workers.
9.  She must be prepared  to  have  all statements  referring  to  eligi-
bility  verified.
Before  the  Supreme  Court  voided  the  "man-in-the-house"  rule,
males  "earned"  AFDC  eligibility for  their family  by  deserting  or  not
marrying the  mother of their children.  AFDC  shows  that increases  in
the number  and the  severity  of criteria  that delimit the set of persons
eligible  for  a  program  do  not  necessarily  decrease  the  number  of
eligible persons.  People  learn  and adjust;  social  attitudes  change;  and
economic  conditions  change.  Over  a  twenty-year  period  ending  in
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cent  rise  in the  total  of  AFDC  recipients.  AFDC  families  increased
from  651,000  to  1,875,000.  Total  AFDC  recipients  (children)  in-
creased from  1,661,000  to 5,413,000.
Whatever commended AFDC cash transfers initially,  changes  over
time caused several problems with the program.  Work was discouraged
among  AFDC  recipients  by  disincentives  that  reduced  the  transfer
payment  one  dollar  for  each  dollar  earned.  Families  in  identical  or
nearly  identical  circumstances  in  different  geographic  areas  received
different  treatment.  Arbitrary  authority  allowed  local  officials  has
often  been  used  to  force  recipients  either  to conform  to  certain  pat-
terns  of  behavior  or  lose  benefits.  Vexed  communities  have  rankled
at  violations  of  their  tenets.  Moreover,  the  ethnic  composition  of
AFDC  recipient families irritated  nonrecipient families  in  many  com-
munities.  These  issues  focused  additional  attention  on  the  need  to
bring about welfare  reform.
The clamor for social equity  reached  such levels  that policy  mak-
ers  turned  their  attention  to  welfare  reform.  From  their  effort  came
not only  proposals  related  to welfare  reform,  but  also proposals  for
poverty elimination and income  maintenance.  Friedman's idea of wel-
fare  reform  based on  the  federal  income  tax  system  did  not  prove
viable, but his idea for removing  some disincentives  to work by reduc-
ing payments  by 50 percent  of increases  in earned income rather than
100  percent  for  each  dollar  earned  proved  viable.  Lampman  and
others  offered  proposals  that  extended  the  analysis  of  the  problem,
but  did  not  effectively  solve  a  central  dilemma:  how  to  move  the
recipient  from  cash  transfer  programs  to  self-support  in  a  manner
that produces  the minimum  disincentive  to work.  Tobin made  an  im-
portant contribution to the solution by his proposal to use  a minimum
payment.  Above  this,  the transfer  payment  would  be  reduced  by  50
percent  of  any  increase  in  earnings.  This  meant  a  recipient  would
have both an incentive to work and increased  income.  Then,  as  capa-
bility  of  self-support  improved,  program  costs  would decrease.
In-Kind  Transfers
Family  assistance  is  a  cash  transfer  program,  but  food  stamps
(an  in-kind  transfer)  are  combined  with  the  program  in  a  way  to
make  them  accessible  to  any  eligible  family.  In  addition,  some  pro-
spective recipients  are now eligible for such in-kind transfers  as  public
housing  and  Medicaid.  As  their  income  rises,  recipients  of  in-kind
transfers normally  pay  an increasing portion  of the value  of the com-
modity  or services  involved.  Because  payment  rates  do  not vary  uni-
formly with income increases,  "notch" problems occur,  causing  cumu-
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cent,  and  in  some  instances  to  exceed  several  hundred  percent.  In
these cases, the disincentive  to earn income at certain levels is obvious.
The  revised Family Assistance  Act of  1970  gives attention  to ways  to
reduce  these disincentives.  (See  appendix  tables,  pp.  84-85.)
A  basic  assumption  underlying  in-kind  transfers  is  that  policy
makers  can  develop  that  combination  of  resources  which  maximizes
satisfaction  of the recipient.  Yet,  what  may maximize  satisfaction  for
the  individual  may  conflict  with  the  objective  sought  by  the  com-
munity.  Public  housing produces new  buildings  for  community  mem-
bers  to  look  at; but  the  housing  does not necessarily  maximize  satis-
faction  for  those  individuals  who  live in  it.  Combining  food  stamps
with  family  assistance  provides  a  similar  case.  At  present,  a  com-
munity  objective  is  to  reduce,  perhaps  eliminate,  hunger  and  mal-
nutrition.  It has  been  argued  that  food  programs  complete  with  an
educational  effort  would  be  more  efficient  than  income  supplements
alone  in closing  the  food and  nutrition gap.
Food  stamps  lacked  a  critical  condition  when  family  assistance
was proposed;  equality  of access  to obtain  food  stamps  did  not exist.
The  revised  version  of  the  Family  Assistance  Act  of  1970  makes
access  universal  and  equal.  It would  permit  a recipient  family  to  in-
dicate  by  a  simple  check  mark  that it  desires  food  stamps,  and  the
charge  will be automatically  deducted  from  the transfer payment  and
the  stamps  mailed  to the  recipient  with  the  payments.  This  arrange-
ment should effectively  close the hunger and nutrition gap for families
with children.
Cost controls  apply  to in-kind  transfer  programs  just  as  to  cash
transfer  programs.  AFDC  costs  (and  those  for  similar  programs)
have  been  paid  directly  from  the  federal  treasury.  Because  federal
monies supplement payment levels set by state  and local governments,
especially  cities, AFDC rolls could expand  and federal  payment  levels
could  rise  without  limit  so  long  as  at least  50  percent  of  costs  came
from  another  level  of  government.  This  practice  would  end  if  the
family  assistance program  were  adopted.
THE  FAMILY  ASSISTANCE  PLAN
Under  the  Family  Assistance  Plan  only  families  with  children
would be  eligible  for  payments.  A  four-person  family  with  no  other
income would  be  eligible  for  a  $1,600  minimum  payment,  based  on
$500 for  the  first two  family  members  and  $300  for  each  additional
member.  This  eliminates  income  discrimination  by  sex,  since  one
family  member  may  be  an  employed  male  head  of  household,  and
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ily  resources  cannot  exceed  $1,500,  except  for  a  home,  household
goods,  and property essential  to  self-support,  a provision  that extends
eligibility to many working poor, including  farmers.  Because  the min-
imum  payment  is  uniform  nationwide  and  the  cost  of  living  varies,
family  assistance  favors  residents  of  rural  areas  compared  to  urban
areas and residents of southern  states compared to nonsouthern  states.
Economic incentives to work appear in family assistance in several
forms.  First, the basic transfer payment  would be  reduced  by only  50
percent  of any increase  in  earned  income  up  to  $3,200.  In  addition,
all income  will be determined  net  of federal  income tax.  Another  in-
centive  excludes  earnings  up to  $60  per month  as  a cost of  working
allowance.  These  incentives  combine  to produce  a net  money break-
even  income  of  $3,920.  Income  payments  will  be  determined  each
quarter.  When  payments  lag  with  respect  to  changes  in  income,
farmers  should benefit because their incomes tend to vary.
A legal  incentive  to work  is  contained  in  the proposal.  The  first
two members  of a  family  unit  must register  for  work  or training  ex-
cept where  one has not reached sixteen years of age,  or is  the mother
of a child not six years of age, or is incapacitated  by illness or age. The
question of  suitable work continues  as  an issue,  but as  revised  by the
administration  the  recipient's  right  of  refusal  of  employment  on
grounds of prior experience  and skills would apply only to cases where
similar  employment  is  actually  available  in  the  community  and  the
individual has not been given adequate  opportunity to obtain  it.
How  a  cash transfer  program  may  affect  the  work  incentive  re-
mains  a  major  concern.  Based  upon  initial  research  data,  the  Uni-
versity of Wisconsin  Institute for  Research on  Poverty  states  that  the
crucial  issue  relating  to  the  effect  on  earnings  is  unresolved  in  the
sense  that no significant  changes  have  been found.  But to  the extent
that  differences  appear  between  control  and  experimental  families
they  are  generally  in favor  of  greater work  effort  for  experimentals.
Hence,  anyone  who  seeks to support  an  argument of drastic  disincen-
tive effects cannot expect to find even weak support in the data so far.
It further states that no evidence  has been  found in the urban  experi-
ment to support the belief that negative-tax-type  income  maintenance
programs  will  produce  large  disincentives  and  subsequent  reduction
in  earnings.  Unfortunately,  this  experiment  does  not  study  response
to changes  in cumulative  marginal  tax rates  when  cash  transfers  and
in-kind transfers combine.
Family  assistance  also  contains  a  mechanism  to  control  cost  at
the federal  level.  Federal  funds would  be  available  to  supplement  30
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the poverty threshold.  This is  a simple mechanism.  Only Congress  can
change the  minimum payment levels.  States  maintaining  cash  transfer
programs  that  exceed  the  poverty  level  cannot  obtain  federal  funds
to  supplement  that  amount  in  excess  of  the  poverty  level.  Poverty
levels  under the revised  proposal  would  be:











Eleven  or more  7,170
Incremental increases  in income supplements  will not be  available
to  families  beyond  eleven  members,  even  though  earnings  of  such
families  do  not  bring  them  to  the  poverty  threshold.  Poverty  levels
must be revised  annually by the Department of Health, Education,  and
Welfare.
By  using  this form  of  cost control  and  by  paying  the  total  costs
of the minimum  program  from  the federal level  income  maintenance
proponents seek  to achieve two objectives:  (1)  raising minimum  pay-
ments  until  at  least  all  children  have  available  poverty  threshold  in-
comes  and  (2)  shifting  income  maintenance  costs  completely  to  the
federal level. In addition,  the program offers  states an option strength-
ened by an economic  incentive  to have family  assistance  administered
at the federal  level.
An estimated  13  million people  living  in 3.7  million  family  units
are eligible  for family  assistance,  according  to  recent  estimates  based
on adjusted data from the Current Population Survey for  1969. About
43  percent of these  families  live in the South.  One-half  of  all  eligible
households  would  be headed  by  a  male.  Among  all  heads  of house-
hold  61  percent  would be white  and  39 percent  nonwhite  (Table  1).
By comparison about  50 percent of current AFDC recipients  are non-
white,  and  about  70  percent  of  the working  poor  are  white.
When day care  and training costs  are  included,  plus the increased
cost  of food  stamps due  to  the  check  off  feature,  net  costs  of  family
assistance are placed  at $4.1 billion. Total federal income maintenance
80TABLE  1.  ESTIMATED  NUMBER  OF  FAMILIES  ELIGIBLE  FOR  FAMILY  ASSISTANCE
BENEFITS  IN  1971,  BY  SELECTED  CHARACTERISTICS
Number
of Families  Percent
Characteristic  (in  Thousands)  of Total
Grand  total  3,678  100.0
Sex of family head
Male  1,846  50.2
Female  1,831  49.8
Race of family head
White  2,258  61.4
Nonwhite  1,420  38.6
Age of family  head
65  and  over  132  3.6
Under  65  3,546  96.4
Region of  residence
Northeast  776  21.1
North  central  747  20.3
South  1,570  42.7
West  585  15.9
Work  experience  of family  head
Work  full  time  all  year  1,167  31.7
Some  work  experience  during  year  1,297  35.3
No work  during year  1,182  32.1
Military  32  0.9
Number of earners  in family
No  earners  883  24.0
One  earner  1,589  43.2
Two  earners  768  20.9
Three  or  more  earners  437  11.9
NOTE:  Based  on  the  March  1969  current  population  survey  which  collected
information  on  family  status  at  the  time  of  the  interview  and  on  income  for  the
preceding  year  (1968).  The  survey  data have  been  adjusted  to  account  for  changes
in  income  and  population  expected  to  occur  from  the  survey  year  to  1971.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Congress,  Senate  Committee  on Finance,  H.R.  16311,  The Family
Assistance  Act of  1970,  91st Congress, 2d Session, June  1970,  Committee  Print, p. 25.
payments are  an estimated $7.8  billion.  These  estimates  are  for  1971
and  are based  on  the  foregoing  eligibility  estimates.  The  total  cost
divides into $5.0  billion  for low-income  households,  including family
assistance,  and $2.8  billion for  the adult  category,  which  would  be  a
single program  combining Old Age Assistance,  Aid to the Blind,  and
Aid to the Permanently  and Totally Disabled.
Family  assistance  directs  money  specifically  to families  with  chil-
dren,  according  to  family  size  and  family  income.  This  is  a  move
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categorical  program limited to children with families, family  assistance
offers  an  effective  replacement  for  a  series  of  program  alternatives
called  children's  allowances,  which  are  used  in many  other  countries
where  different  economic  conditions  exist.  Children's  allowances  are
a costly  and inefficient  means  of correcting  income distribution  prob-
lems.
Critics  fault family  assistance  for excluding  unrelated  individuals
and  married  couples  without  children  and  for  not being  a  universal
program.  It may  also be  criticized  for the  low  level  of  proposed  ex-
penditures  on  day  care  and  training  programs.  Both  programs  will
be extremely difficult to deliver for rural areas. The consequence could
seriously  strain  the meaningful  application  of  the  work  registry  pro-
vision  and  possibly  destroy  it,  in  time,  without  considerable  adjust-
ment.
For each  1 percent  rise from  a  3.8 percent  rate of unemployment,
an estimated  100,000 families would  become eligible for family  assist-
ance  at  a  cost  of  $100  million.  The  effect  will  prove  moderately
countercyclical,  while  affording  families  some protection  against  eco-
nomic  forces  beyond  their control.  Whatever  effect  changes  in  em-
ployment  rates  may  have  on  family  assistance,  the  developing  core
issue  is  access  to job  opportunity,  and  if  family  assistance  becomes
effective,  this issue  will gather  momentum.
GUARANTEED  EMPLOYMENT
Solving  the  developing  issue  of  jobs  will prove  slow  and  painful,
and  much  discussion  and  analysis  will  be  required  before  effective
solutions develop.
Removing  emotion  from  discussion  of  guaranteed  employment
may  prove  difficult,  because  this  income  maintenance  alternative
creates  a "make work" image. This changes,  however, when it is recog-
nized  that  guaranteed  employment  produces  (1)  useful  goods  and
services,  (2)  skills which may be transferred to the private sector,  and
(3)  psychological  benefits  to both the worker  and  the  society.
Minimum  income  payment  schemes  have been  criticized  for  lack
of attention to job creation,  a failure which can be fatal to the  avowed
objective  of fighting poverty.  Though family  assistance  does  not pur-
port  to eliminate  poverty,  the  design to  do so  by raising  payments  is
present.
To correct  for the lack of job  opportunities,  it has been  suggested
that seventy  existing uncoordinated  federal job programs be combined
under  a  single  agency.  Employers  would  be required  to register  jobs
available,  but  not  to  hire  those  persons  seeking  job  opportunities
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industry  and  government  as  well  as conduct  its  own  program  to  de-
velop skills among  the unskilled.
One  goal  of  this  proposal  is  to  lower  unemployment  rates  to  2
percent.  An estimated  $50  billion  would  be  added  annually  to  gross
national  product by fully employing  the labor  force,  for  an estimated
net cost to taxpayers of some  $5  billion.  A refundable  tax program  is
included  with  this  scheme,  which  needs  a means  of  controlling  infla-
tion.
Guaranteed  employment  programs  normally  provide  for  wage
subsidies, the amount paid in excess of the worker's economic  produc-
tivity. The  wage  subsidy can  be used  to  achieve  other  objectives.  For
example,  this  form  of  subsidy  may  delay  substitution  of  capital  for
labor and keep  some persons  who cannot  be easily  retrained  working
at jobs.  Changes in the minimum wage  affect the employment of  such
persons,  and wage  subsidies could  usefully  apply.  Wage subsidies  tend
to favor employers for a number of reasons. Thus, these are not simple
problems  and may well be examined  in greater depth at  another time.
SERVICE  PROGRAMS
A cash transfer program  such as family assistance  will have highly
visible  costs.  As  a result,  policy  efforts  will  seek to  lower these  costs
to  a minimum,  a sound policy objective in any  situation. Basic health,
education,  and employment  programs  will have high priority.
Delivery of many  current programs is highly ineffective.  Few rural
people  are  aware  that  a  single  family  could  effectively  benefit  from
locally  based  service  programs  funded  from  more  than  half  of  210
formula  grant programs  and  nearly  all  of  the 50  formula  grant pro-
grams  supported  by  the  Department  of Health,  Education,  and  Wel-
fare.  The Commission on Income  Maintenance  Programs has said  the
reason for this  lack of awareness  is that  the major burdens  of the task
of integrating these  programs  at the local  level have fallen  upon  local
officials  with little familiarity  with the federal  administrative  structures
and policies.
Many  people  agree  that the federal  government  will  have  a  self-
imposed incentive to improve program  and service delivery  as a means
of  lowering  family  assistance  program  costs.  The  bill passed  by  the
House of Representatives  did not overlook this point, and it authorizes
federal  assistance  for states which establish  a comprehensive  program
to  coordinate  delivery  of  service  programs.  An  educational  agency
associated  with  the land-grant  system  may find  that it  can  contribute
effectively  to lowering  costs of  an income maintenance  program  using
cash transfers.
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